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A Partial Break of the Honeypots Defense
to Catch Adversarial Attacks
Nicholas Carlini (Google Brain)
Abstract—A recent defense proposes to inject “honeypots” into
neural networks in order to detect adversarial attacks. We break
the baseline version of this defense by reducing the detection true
positive rate to 0%, and the detection AUC to 0.02, maintaining
the original distortion bounds. The authors of the original paper
have amended the defense in their CCS’20 paper to mitigate this
attacks. To aid further research, we release the complete 2.5 hour
keystroke-by-keystroke screen recording of our attack process at
https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/ccs honeypot break.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shan et al. [2] (CCS’20) recently proposed a honeypots-based
defense against adversarial examples. This defense injects a
backdoor into a neural network during training, and then
shows that adversarial examples generated on this classifier
share similar activation patterns to backdoored inputs—and
can therefore be detected with near-perfect accuracy.
The authors of this paper provided us with early access to
an implementation of this defense. We find that the baseline
version of this defense is completely ineffective. We reduce
the AUC to below 0.02 (random guessing gives 0.50), for a
true positive of 0% at a false positive rate of 10%. In response,
the authors have amended the defense introducing additional
randomness and layers that mitigate this attack. This short
paper analyzes the baseline version of the defense.
II. ATTACKING THE HONEYPOT DEFENSE
We assume familiarity with prior work on adversarial exam-
ples [3], and breaking adversarial examples detectors [1]. We
use f(x) to denote a trained neural network evaluated on input
image x. An adversarial example is an input x′ so that ‖x−x′‖
is small (under some ℓp norm) but f(x) 6= f(x
′).
The Honeypot Defense injects a backdoor perturbation ∆
during the neural network training process so that for all inputs
x, the classifier will consistently and predictably misclassify
f(x + ∆). As a result of this backdoor, standard methods
to generate adversarial examples will create examples x′ that
have “characteristics” of the backdoored inputs.
These characteristics are formalized by comparing the cosine
similarity between the hidden vectors h(x′) and the average
backdoored hidden vector φ = Ex∈X (h(x+∆)). That is, for
a given input x, the defense computes
sim(h(x), φ) =
h(x) · φ
‖h(x)‖ ‖φ‖
and rejects an input x as adversarial if sim(h(x), φ) > τ .
Threat Model. This defense argues robustness under the ℓ∞
norm threat model (ǫ = 8/255) for both (a) a full white-box
threat model, and (b) a limited white-box threat model where
the adversary has access to the trained model fθ but not the
signature φ. The defense reports a 0.97 minimum AUC across
all prior attacks, and claims a 0.76 AUC against the strongest
adaptive attacks that allow a 6.3× larger distortion bound.
A. Initial White-Box Attack: Reducing AUC to 0.46
Following recent advice [4], we design a loss function to be as
simple as possible to make it easy to diagnose difficulties in
optimization. Thus, we adopt the most common attack tech-
nique, and minimize a weighted sum of the misclassification
loss and the detection-evading loss:
arg max
δ:‖δ‖∞≤ǫ
Lxe
(
f(x+ δ), y
)
− λ · Ld
(
h(x+ δ), φ
)
(1)
where Lxe is standard cross-entropy loss, Ld = sim(h(x), φ)
is the loss of the detector (defined on the signature φ for the
hidden vector h(·)), and λ is a hyperparameter controlling the
relative importance of the two terms1. We directly minimize
this loss function with 100 iterations of ℓ∞-regularized gradi-
ent descent with a step size of 0.1.
This form of loss function is not new: we used it extensively
in prior work [1], and the honeypot defense paper used it to
perform its own adaptive attack [2]. Nevertheless, the attack
is effective at reducing the defense AUC to 0.46—below the
threshold of 0.5 corresponding to random guessing. We are
unable to explain why our attack succeeded when the authors
attempt at this exact formulation failed.
B. Improved White-Box Attack: Reducing AUC to 0.02
The above loss formulation has a weakness: an optimal attack
method should satisfy three constraints simultaneously. The
final generated adversarial example:
• should introduce a sufficiently small perturbation;
• should be misclassified as a particular target class; and,
• should not be detected as adversarial by the detector.
Solving Equation 1 guarantees that the perturbation is bounded
correctly (because of the hard constraint), but does not guar-
antee the other two properties. When minimizing Equation 1,
we might over-optimize the cross-entropy loss at the expense
of the detection loss (if λ is too small) or instead that we
1We set λ = 8 for our attacks. Manual binary search determined that λ = 5
was too small and λ = 10 was too large. Setting λ = 8 was just right.
might might over-optimize the detection loss (if λ is too big).
Instead, we would like to ensure that whenever the input
already adversarial, all available distortion “budget” goes into
fooling the detector (and vice versa).
We thus consider an improved attack that alternates between
two gradient descent procedures. As long as the input x+ δ is
misclassified, i.e., f(x + δ) 6= y, we perform straightforward
gradient descent minimizing the detection loss:
δ ← proj‖δ‖≤ε
(
δ − η · ∇Ld(h(x+ δ), φ)
)
(2)
taking steps of size η and ensuring the perturbation remains
bounded within the ℓ∞ box with norm ǫ.
Alternatively, if instead f(x + δ) = y, then we minimize the
cross-entropy loss. As a first attempt we update with
δ ← proj‖δ‖≤ε
(
δ + η · ∇Lxe(f(x+ δ), y)
)
. (3)
By doing this, we can ensure that every gradient descent step
is helpful: when x+ δ is misclassified we take steps to reduce
the likelihood it is detected; when x + δ is not misclassified
we take steps to increase the cross entropy loss.
This has one drawback: often these two steps point in opposite
directions. Progress is then slow, with each step “undoing” the
progress made in the prior step. To alleviate this, whenever
we take steps to make the input more adversarial, we ensure
that doing so does not also make the input more detectable.
This is achieved by ensuring that all cross-entropy steps are
orthogonal to the detection gradient direction. Formally, let
gx = ∇Lxe(f(x+ δ), y) (4)
gd = ∇Ld(h(x + δ), φ) (5)
then we replace Equation 3 with
δ ← proj‖δ‖≤ε
(
δ + η ·
(
gx − gd
gd · gx
‖gd‖‖gx‖
))
. (6)
These two approaches are identical when allowed a sufficient
number of iterations of gradient descent. However, it is easy to
see why this procedure is more efficient for a limited number
of gradient descent steps: for sufficiently small step sizes η, the
update rule in Equation 6 is guaranteed to be orthogonal the
gradient direction from Equation 4. Therefore, we never make
negative progress on steps in this direction. This improved
attack reduces the classifier AUC to 0.02.
C. Attacking without Signature Knowledge
The defense also claims robustness against an adversary who
is not aware of the signature φ. Unfortunately, the defense is
also broken under this threat model. Because of the intuition
of the defense—that typical adversarial examples will have a
signature similar to φ—it is possible to estimate it through
φ˜ = Ex∈X (h(A(x))
whereA(x) generates an adversarial example on input x. Then
we run exactly the prior attack substituting φ˜ for φ.
More generally, consider an adversary who computes two
adversarial examples x′ and x′′ for a given input x such that
h(x′) · h(x′′) = 0. Then by randomly returning one of these
inputs as the result ofA(x), is will be definitionally impossible
for the classifier to obtain greater than a 50% true positive rate.
D. Mitigating this Attack
The honeypot defense authors have mitigated this attack in the
final version of their paper. We do not analyze the robustness
of this modified scheme, and refer the reader to the updated
paper for details on how the scheme has been modified. It
is an interesting and open question to study if the improved
defense could be evaded with a stronger attack.
III. DISCUSSION
The attacks presented above are simple modifications of well-
known methods, and apply gradient descent to a well-crafted
loss function. This phenomenon is not new—an appropriate
implementation of gradient descent has sufficed for breaking
many defenses published over the last several years [4].
Although we should not require that published defenses be
perfect and resist all attack, we should hope that attacks
on published defenses require novel attack approaches. Even
when defenses can be broken, if they require sophisticated
attacks then they can be extremely valuable in order to help
better understand what are and are not fundamental properties
of adversarial examples. However, when breaks amount to
“apply gradient descent”, there are few generalizable lessons
other than that one particular idea does not work.
In order to provide more perspective, we recorded our 2.5
hour attack, keystroke-by-keystroke, to document the steps we
follow. (This two and a half hours goes from first inspecting
the code to the final break, and is not an atypical amount of
time; attacks in [4] took similarly long.) We hope this addi-
tional artifact might provide useful for developing improved
procedures for assessing performance of studied defenses:
https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/ccs honeypot break
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